Consistent Contradictions: the Mismatch between an Imagined North Korea and the Real Role of the USFK
Introduction:
In 2004, the United States and South Korea signed the Yongsan Relocation Plan, agreeing to transfer the Yongsan Garrison and the Second Infantry Division to an expanded Camp Humphrys Base in Pyeongtaek. The goal of this project is to create a state-of-the-art “strategic hub” south of Seoul in accordance with the United States’ plan for the realignment and strategic flexibility of the USFK.
The U.S. military has been largely hands off in the actual construction of the base in Pyongtaek. General B. B. Bell, Commander of the USFK and the Korea-United States Combined Forces Command, however, has been busy trying to win approval for the plan from Korean citizens and the U.S. Congress alike. In so doing, his approach, particularly in speaking of the threat from North Korea, has been highly inconsistent; his presentations have varied greatly depending on which aspect of the base expansion project he is addressing and to whom he is speaking. Examining Bell’s contradictory statements exposes the true nature of the realignment of the USFK – the creation of a modernized force ready for global deployment – as well as the ideological function of North Korea in U.S. military policy discourse.
Background
Since signing the Yongsan Relocation Plan, the Noh Moo-hyun administration has relentlessly pushed forth its plan to expand the Camp Humphrys Base. While the U.S. has, apart from pressuring the ROK to shell out more and more money, sat back and watched quietly, the government has mobilized massive national power to drive the villagers in the Paengsung area of Pyeongtaek, where the expansion is taking place, off their land. U.S. officials and policy-makers never mention this state violence when discussing the project. Commander Bell recently described the current situation to the U.S. Senate Armed Service Committee as follows: “The South Koreans have spent an enormous amount of money already helping us with this move. They bought 2,800 acres of land next to a place called Camp Humphrys, south of Seoul, for a billion dollars -- bought it from the local citizens. And it's there where we want to do this expansion” (Bell, SASC transcript, 32-33).
Bell’s words conveniently leave out the real story behind this “purchase of land,” as lived by the residents of Daechuri and Doduri, villages in the Paengsung area. For these people it is impossible to forget: they experienced years of torment by riot police, soldiers trampled through their villages and fields, bulldozers and cranes invaded and destroyed their homes, which finally led to the destruction of their communities and forced eviction early this year. All of this is neatly erased in the U.S. military policy discourse. By pursuing its realignment plan as a partnership with the South Korean government, the U.S. has been able to hide safely behind the legality of its bi-lateral agreements and the objective fairness of what it characterizes as a simple market transaction.
The Noh administration is fully committed to the Korea-U.S. military alliance and the realignment of the USFK, through which it is seeking to achieve the modernization of the ROK military. As such, it has willingly complied with the creation of a strategic hub at Pyeongtaek; it has promised to contribute 5.5 trillion won to fund the base transfer and expansion, more than half of the expense of what is estimated to be a 10 trillion won project. If the part of the U.S.’s contribution that will come out of funds Korea has committed to support the USFK through the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) is included, Korea’s actual share will be at least 75% of the total cost.
In fact, the South Korean government has agreed through SMA for each of the last several years to cover a growing percent of the cost of stationing the U.S. troops; its commitment for 2007-2008 amounts to 725.5 billion won. The U.S. calculates this plus other direct funds to be 41% of the USFK’s non-personnel stationing costs. Commander Bell has asserted over and over again that the Army will not be satisfied until the ROK’s direct contribution equals 50%, or what he calls ‘equitable burden sharing. However, according to the Ministry of Defense’s calculations, the ROK’s commitment has already reached 53%. This calculation discrepancy is in part due to the USFK’s failure to include indirect ROK payments, such as uncollected land-rent and tax exemptions, as well as manpower benefits of KATUSA inclusion into the USFK (which means less salary expenditure for the USFK). Thus, it is clear that the ROK already covers well over half of the total expense.
While pushing for equitability in covering the expense of stationing the U.S. forces, however, Bell has been quite clear that equity is not part of the picture when it comes to the base expansion project. He has almost bragged to Congress that the ROK has agreed to pay, “billions and billions and billions of dollars, maybe as much as $6 billion to $7 billion…[and] something dramatically less than that to be spent by the United States to make this move” (Bell, Senate Armed Service Committee, 33). Bell asserts that this is proof that the ROK supports the continued U.S. military presence in Korea into the distant future.
Role of the USFK?
We are told that the realignment of the USFK and their very presence in South Korea are for the purpose of strengthening defense against the potential North Korean aggression. This has been the premise of the U.S.-Korea military alliance since the end of the Korean War. Yet while the official line of the USFK and both governments continues to validate this justification for the U.S. troops’ presence, recent statements by commander Bell call it into serious question. On April 17, in a statement made at a Gyeonggi Province Municipal Leadership Forum, Commander Bell said that he believed that by 2025 normalization with North Korea would be achieved. Moreover, the United States military would still be welcomed in Korea, stationed with “a full array of military capabilities on the Peninsula and in the region” (Municipal Leadership Speech, 2). Bell’s statement alludes to the fact that the United States’ interests in Korea have less to do with defense against North Korea than with its own long-term hegemony in the region. This inconsistency in approach to the North Korean threat and the role of the USFK characterizes Commander Bell’s discussions of the realignment of the USFK and of the base expansion project.
The North Korean Threat?
In his formal reports to the U.S. Congress, Bell portrays North Korea as “the key destablizer” in the region, posing a grave danger to South Korea (Bell, HASC, 8). It is necessary, the reports claim, to increase the USFK’s defense capability against North Korea. This requires greater investment in modern computers, command, control and communications equipment and intelligence systems (C4I) and improvement of missile defense and munitions stocks. Bell’s reports to the House and Senate Armed Service Committees (March 7, April 24) describe pending upgrades in coordinated command and intelligence systems between the USFK and ROK as well as other ‘friendly forces.’ In his emphasizes on the need for expanded training facilities, Bell states, "(i)n order to be ready and continue to deter aggression on the peninsula, our training must evolve to keep pace with the transformation of our military structure.” He specifies that, “USFK faces challenges in training range and airspace access. Facilities for our naval forces exist but scheduling and allocation must be improved to fully support combat readiness requirements. We need access to a modern and instrumented air to ground bombing range" (Bell, HASC, 19). These are supposedly necessary for improving readiness to counter a North Korean attack.
Bell contradicts his own written statements, however, during question and answer sessions with congressional representatives by downplaying the North Korean threat. The U.S. air and naval power greatly outmatch North Korea’s air and maritime capacity without needing to be strengthened, Bell himself claimed. In his hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on March 7, he called the North Korean air-force a “legacy air-force,” explaining, “(t)hey got most of their aircraft during the cold war, they don’t make any new aircraft, their doing overhaul, they’re not getting any new aircraft from their traditional suppliers, and so they are making do with what they have… They don’t train to the levels that our air-force or navy, or certainly the Republic of Korea trains. The levels of flying hours to be ready are about 10% of what you would see in our air-force or our navy.” He concluded, “I’m not overly concerned about the ability of the North Korean air-force to be a factor… We can deal with the North Korean air-force quickly and decisively and it will cease to be a factor very quickly" (Bell, audio, 1:04).
Then, it is quite obvious that building training grounds for the air-force and navy is not a response to a critical need to face down a threat from North Korean. The March 7 report submitted by General William J. Fallon, then Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, more explicitly indicates that these changes have a much larger goal; they are “crucial to success in the War on Terror and regional stability,” especially in the face of growing Chinese military capacity (Fallon, HASC, 28). It is clear then, that North Korea is only one of many targets of the modernization of USFK command and intelligence activities, much of which is to be based at Camp Humphrys. Thus, the planned reorganization of the USKF calls for the strengthening of maritime and airpower and the substantial reduction of ground troops in order to create a more mobile force capable of quick dispatch outside of the peninsula; this is the strategic flexibility of the USFK to which the Noh administration has consented. Re-focusing capacity in the air-force and navy is taking place while, by Bell’s own admission, the strength of the North Korean military lies, if anywhere, in its army.
While the logic of defense against North Korea would call for the strengthening of the U.S. army in Korea to stand up to North Korean ground troops, the truth is that U.S. ground forces are being reduced. This being the case, we might expect that when questioned about the threat of a North Korean ground attack, Bell would emphasize the need to strengthen the remaining troops or at least express confidence in their capability despite the reduction. In fact, however, his answer has been exactly the opposite. When asked, for instance, about the toll the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have had on the USFK’s ability to respond to crisis on the peninsula during the Senate Committee on Armed Services hearing on April 24, Bell responded that he felt very secure about the ability of the Marines and Air-force but, “not as satisfied, to say the least, with Army ability to respond or Marine Corps ability to respond.” He added very quickly, however, that “(t)he really good news in the Republic of Korea is… that we've got a terrific ally with a great military, and their strength happens to be their army and their Marine Corps" (Senate Armed Service Committee, 14). In fact, then, the reorganization of the USFK means placing greater reliance in the strength of the ROK army while U.S. ground forces are concentrated in the Middle East.
Bell has tried to portray the rearrangement of the relationship and roles of the ROK military and the USFK as mutually beneficial and supportive. In his official statement to Congress he wrote, “(t)his evolution provides a stronger and more complementary Alliance that is better organized to meet ROK securities needs and our mutual interests in the region” (Bell, ASC, 18). Despite such rhetoric, in question and answer sessions during congressional hearings he has repeatedly emphasized that he expects the ROK army to play the major part in defending the nation. He told Senate Armed Service Committee members:
It is now time for us (the U.S.) to turn over more and more of the security responsibility of the Republic of Korea to the Koreans… Part of that is an agreement that the two nations have made at the senior administration level to move our forces from north of Seoul and in Seoul to south of Seoul, thus ensuring that the South Koreans are responsible for dealing directly with the threat along the DMZ. And second, getting our forces literally out from under artillery range. And last, allowing us to consolidate at efficient hubs, instead of these often-times pathetic little enclaves where we are still living and working. (Senate Armed Services, 32)
At the same time as he continues to demand the ROK pay more and more money to keep the U.S. stationed in South Korea, Bell himself has admitted that rather than constructing a “strong and more complimentary Alliance,” the U.S. is moving its troops out of the way of the most significant threat in order to carry out its training. What is more, if the exercises conducted at U.S. bases in Korea over the last few years are any indicators, it is likely that the goal of training is not merely preparation for conflict with North Korea, but also for participation in the U.S. initiated wars in the Middle East. In 2004, the U.S. military publication, Stars and Stripes, reported the first example of the strategic flexibility of the USFK: the deployment of the Second Infantry Divisions’ 3,600-man Brigade Combat Team or “Strikeforce” to Iraq, and continued to follow their activity in the volatile city of Ramadi for the next year (Stars and Stripes, Pacific Edition, August 4 2004). Strikeforce moved to Fort Carson, Colorado upon completion of their one-year rotation, but it has since become clear that control of their brigade, rather than being relinquished to commanders in the Middle East, has always remained in the hands of the Second Infantry Division with the brigade eventually returning to Korea. More recently, Stars and Stripes has reported that Second Infantry Division battalions carried out ambush drills in February of 2006 at the Rodriquez Range in Northern Gyeonggi Province in preparation for participation in the Iraq war and the 52nd Medical Battalion trained for dispatch to Iraq and Afghanistan at Warrior Base, also in Northern Gyeonggi Province in March 2006 (Stars and Stripes Pacific Edition, February 22 and March 3, 2006). In March of this year the RSOI (Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration/Foal Eagle) exercises took place, bringing U.S. troops stationed in Hawaii and Okinawa to Korea to participate in the training (Stars and Stripes Pacific Edition, March 15 and 26, 2007). In addition, Stars and Stripes has reported that Patriot Missile units in Korea are currently involved in a new rotation system called Army Force Generation, which is aimed at getting troops ready for global deployment. Considering these instances, it is possible to predict that the new training facilities at Camp Humphrys will not only be used for improving readiness for the “defense of Korea,’ but also for the training of the USFK and even troops stationed elsewhere in the world before they are dispatched to take their place in the United States’ so-called “War on Terror.”
Bell has also spoken of North Korea several times as if it in fact poses no real threat at all. He told the House Armed Service Committee for instance: "(North Korea), at the end of the Cold War, lost their client states, Russia and China in terms of re-supplying large quantities of material and equipment. The exercise program they had in those days is no longer conducted. So North Korea is quite isolated with respect to their ability to generate combat power” (Bell, House AS, audio, 35min). General Fallon also made the statement that, “the threat of conflict in this region (East Asia) is low and continues to be that,” (audio, 10) and “I believe we have the capabilities today to over-match any threat today and for the foreseeable future” (audio, 1:08).
If such statements seem to entirely contradict the portrayal of North Korea in Bell’s official reports, this is because his objectives in the two cases are different: In the official documents Bell is relying on cold-war style vilification of North Korea to justify U.S. presence and military expansion in Korea; however, when in dialogue with Congress members he has sought to allay concerns that the war in the Middle East is compromising security in East Asia by minimizing the threat of a North Korean attack. In addition, Bell has another project in mind for which he must win congressional support: many of the new buildings planned for Camp Humphries are meant for the families of service members, whom Bell proposes to bring to Korea.
Planned Community for Soldiers’ Families
Currently, members of the U.S. Armed Forces serve a one-year term of duty when stationed in Korea. Most come without their families. This system of ‘unaccompanied one-year rotations’ is standard practice for the U.S. military in ‘combat’ situations. But, Bell has stated, the designation of ‘combat-mentality rotations’ no longer applies because Korea is no longer a ‘combat’ situation. Regardless of the way he has played up the North Korean threat at times, Bell’s plan to bring families to Korea reinforces the position he and Fallon have taken that the threat of conflict in the region is low. As such, he is preparing to submit a proposal to the Department of Defense calling for a change to ‘three-year accompanied terms’—meaning that many if not all married USKF servicemembers will bring their families to live with them in Korea in apartments built at Camp Humphrys. According to Bell, the new construction taking place in Pyongtaek will create “planned communities that… integrate work spaces/areas, barracks, dormitories, family housing, schools, day care centers, religious facilities, shopping areas, and MWR activities” (Bell, House Appropriations Committee Statement, 10). Camp Humphrys will also include a golf course, swimming pool and recreation facilities for servicemembers and their families. The South Korean government is providing the money to build some of these facilities through the Yongsan Base Relocation and Land Partnership Plans and through increased burden share funds gathered from Korean citizens’ taxes. It is also providing the land free of charge on which the U.S. can build, having forcibly evicted the residents from the Paengsung area. All of this despite the fact that, clearly, planned communities for family members of U.S. soldiers have very little to do with South Korea’s national defense.
Conclusion
Why is it that Bell’s assertions have been consistently so inconsistent with each other? It is because he has been engaged in several different conversations, motivated by different agendas, at the same time. The first – the official discourse of his written statements –rests on the premise of the U.S. as a protector of South Korea, an ideological relic of the Cold War which still serves to justify the U.S. military presence and modernization of the USFK. A second involves demonstrating to the United States Congress that the U.S. is putting its interest first and gaining a great deal from the base transfer and expansion, yet is made palatable through references to a more equal relationship between the ROK and the U.S., for which the ROK has asked. A third involves defending against accusations that the wars in the Middle East are too taxing. Finally, a fourth is an effort to justify his plans for 3-year accompanied service rotations for the USFK.
Throughout these conversations the changing characterization of North Korea – from impotent and backwards to menacing and maniacal – tells us very little about the real level of threat posed by North Korea and nothing at all about the regime as a political actor in East Asia. It does, however, demonstrate that in the U.S. military policy discourse, North Korea functions not as a real object of examination or a subject with which to be engaged, but rather as an ideological other that can take center stage when military build-up needs justification and then move to the back row when other matters of concern are under discussion.
In all his contradictory explanations Bell has never stated clearly the true purpose of the realignment of the U.S. troops and the base expansion at Pyeongtaek, but we can logically deduce from his statements and in the construction plans for Camp Humphrys: The goal is the creation of a flexible force capable of carrying out acts of aggression in East Asia and the Middle East and the construction of an outpost for their training, for the storage of advanced munitions, and for the collection and processing of intelligence. It will also be a protected zone of luxury for the families of U.S. servicemembers, while it anchors the U.S. hegemony in the region.
In 2004, the United States and South Korea signed the Yongsan Relocation Plan, agreeing to transfer the Yongsan Garrison and the Second Infantry Division to an expanded Camp Humphrys Base in Pyeongtaek. The goal of this project is to create a state-of-the-art “strategic hub” south of Seoul in accordance with the United States’ plan for the realignment and strategic flexibility of the USFK.
The U.S. military has been largely hands off in the actual construction of the base in Pyongtaek. General B. B. Bell, Commander of the USFK and the Korea-United States Combined Forces Command, however, has been busy trying to win approval for the plan from Korean citizens and the U.S. Congress alike. In so doing, his approach, particularly in speaking of the threat from North Korea, has been highly inconsistent; his presentations have varied greatly depending on which aspect of the base expansion project he is addressing and to whom he is speaking. Examining Bell’s contradictory statements exposes the true nature of the realignment of the USFK – the creation of a modernized force ready for global deployment – as well as the ideological function of North Korea in U.S. military policy discourse.
Background
Since signing the Yongsan Relocation Plan, the Noh Moo-hyun administration has relentlessly pushed forth its plan to expand the Camp Humphrys Base. While the U.S. has, apart from pressuring the ROK to shell out more and more money, sat back and watched quietly, the government has mobilized massive national power to drive the villagers in the Paengsung area of Pyeongtaek, where the expansion is taking place, off their land. U.S. officials and policy-makers never mention this state violence when discussing the project. Commander Bell recently described the current situation to the U.S. Senate Armed Service Committee as follows: “The South Koreans have spent an enormous amount of money already helping us with this move. They bought 2,800 acres of land next to a place called Camp Humphrys, south of Seoul, for a billion dollars -- bought it from the local citizens. And it's there where we want to do this expansion” (Bell, SASC transcript, 32-33).
Bell’s words conveniently leave out the real story behind this “purchase of land,” as lived by the residents of Daechuri and Doduri, villages in the Paengsung area. For these people it is impossible to forget: they experienced years of torment by riot police, soldiers trampled through their villages and fields, bulldozers and cranes invaded and destroyed their homes, which finally led to the destruction of their communities and forced eviction early this year. All of this is neatly erased in the U.S. military policy discourse. By pursuing its realignment plan as a partnership with the South Korean government, the U.S. has been able to hide safely behind the legality of its bi-lateral agreements and the objective fairness of what it characterizes as a simple market transaction.
The Noh administration is fully committed to the Korea-U.S. military alliance and the realignment of the USFK, through which it is seeking to achieve the modernization of the ROK military. As such, it has willingly complied with the creation of a strategic hub at Pyeongtaek; it has promised to contribute 5.5 trillion won to fund the base transfer and expansion, more than half of the expense of what is estimated to be a 10 trillion won project. If the part of the U.S.’s contribution that will come out of funds Korea has committed to support the USFK through the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) is included, Korea’s actual share will be at least 75% of the total cost.
In fact, the South Korean government has agreed through SMA for each of the last several years to cover a growing percent of the cost of stationing the U.S. troops; its commitment for 2007-2008 amounts to 725.5 billion won. The U.S. calculates this plus other direct funds to be 41% of the USFK’s non-personnel stationing costs. Commander Bell has asserted over and over again that the Army will not be satisfied until the ROK’s direct contribution equals 50%, or what he calls ‘equitable burden sharing. However, according to the Ministry of Defense’s calculations, the ROK’s commitment has already reached 53%. This calculation discrepancy is in part due to the USFK’s failure to include indirect ROK payments, such as uncollected land-rent and tax exemptions, as well as manpower benefits of KATUSA inclusion into the USFK (which means less salary expenditure for the USFK). Thus, it is clear that the ROK already covers well over half of the total expense.
While pushing for equitability in covering the expense of stationing the U.S. forces, however, Bell has been quite clear that equity is not part of the picture when it comes to the base expansion project. He has almost bragged to Congress that the ROK has agreed to pay, “billions and billions and billions of dollars, maybe as much as $6 billion to $7 billion…[and] something dramatically less than that to be spent by the United States to make this move” (Bell, Senate Armed Service Committee, 33). Bell asserts that this is proof that the ROK supports the continued U.S. military presence in Korea into the distant future.
Role of the USFK?
We are told that the realignment of the USFK and their very presence in South Korea are for the purpose of strengthening defense against the potential North Korean aggression. This has been the premise of the U.S.-Korea military alliance since the end of the Korean War. Yet while the official line of the USFK and both governments continues to validate this justification for the U.S. troops’ presence, recent statements by commander Bell call it into serious question. On April 17, in a statement made at a Gyeonggi Province Municipal Leadership Forum, Commander Bell said that he believed that by 2025 normalization with North Korea would be achieved. Moreover, the United States military would still be welcomed in Korea, stationed with “a full array of military capabilities on the Peninsula and in the region” (Municipal Leadership Speech, 2). Bell’s statement alludes to the fact that the United States’ interests in Korea have less to do with defense against North Korea than with its own long-term hegemony in the region. This inconsistency in approach to the North Korean threat and the role of the USFK characterizes Commander Bell’s discussions of the realignment of the USFK and of the base expansion project.
The North Korean Threat?
In his formal reports to the U.S. Congress, Bell portrays North Korea as “the key destablizer” in the region, posing a grave danger to South Korea (Bell, HASC, 8). It is necessary, the reports claim, to increase the USFK’s defense capability against North Korea. This requires greater investment in modern computers, command, control and communications equipment and intelligence systems (C4I) and improvement of missile defense and munitions stocks. Bell’s reports to the House and Senate Armed Service Committees (March 7, April 24) describe pending upgrades in coordinated command and intelligence systems between the USFK and ROK as well as other ‘friendly forces.’ In his emphasizes on the need for expanded training facilities, Bell states, "(i)n order to be ready and continue to deter aggression on the peninsula, our training must evolve to keep pace with the transformation of our military structure.” He specifies that, “USFK faces challenges in training range and airspace access. Facilities for our naval forces exist but scheduling and allocation must be improved to fully support combat readiness requirements. We need access to a modern and instrumented air to ground bombing range" (Bell, HASC, 19). These are supposedly necessary for improving readiness to counter a North Korean attack.
Bell contradicts his own written statements, however, during question and answer sessions with congressional representatives by downplaying the North Korean threat. The U.S. air and naval power greatly outmatch North Korea’s air and maritime capacity without needing to be strengthened, Bell himself claimed. In his hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on March 7, he called the North Korean air-force a “legacy air-force,” explaining, “(t)hey got most of their aircraft during the cold war, they don’t make any new aircraft, their doing overhaul, they’re not getting any new aircraft from their traditional suppliers, and so they are making do with what they have… They don’t train to the levels that our air-force or navy, or certainly the Republic of Korea trains. The levels of flying hours to be ready are about 10% of what you would see in our air-force or our navy.” He concluded, “I’m not overly concerned about the ability of the North Korean air-force to be a factor… We can deal with the North Korean air-force quickly and decisively and it will cease to be a factor very quickly" (Bell, audio, 1:04).
Then, it is quite obvious that building training grounds for the air-force and navy is not a response to a critical need to face down a threat from North Korean. The March 7 report submitted by General William J. Fallon, then Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, more explicitly indicates that these changes have a much larger goal; they are “crucial to success in the War on Terror and regional stability,” especially in the face of growing Chinese military capacity (Fallon, HASC, 28). It is clear then, that North Korea is only one of many targets of the modernization of USFK command and intelligence activities, much of which is to be based at Camp Humphrys. Thus, the planned reorganization of the USKF calls for the strengthening of maritime and airpower and the substantial reduction of ground troops in order to create a more mobile force capable of quick dispatch outside of the peninsula; this is the strategic flexibility of the USFK to which the Noh administration has consented. Re-focusing capacity in the air-force and navy is taking place while, by Bell’s own admission, the strength of the North Korean military lies, if anywhere, in its army.
While the logic of defense against North Korea would call for the strengthening of the U.S. army in Korea to stand up to North Korean ground troops, the truth is that U.S. ground forces are being reduced. This being the case, we might expect that when questioned about the threat of a North Korean ground attack, Bell would emphasize the need to strengthen the remaining troops or at least express confidence in their capability despite the reduction. In fact, however, his answer has been exactly the opposite. When asked, for instance, about the toll the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have had on the USFK’s ability to respond to crisis on the peninsula during the Senate Committee on Armed Services hearing on April 24, Bell responded that he felt very secure about the ability of the Marines and Air-force but, “not as satisfied, to say the least, with Army ability to respond or Marine Corps ability to respond.” He added very quickly, however, that “(t)he really good news in the Republic of Korea is… that we've got a terrific ally with a great military, and their strength happens to be their army and their Marine Corps" (Senate Armed Service Committee, 14). In fact, then, the reorganization of the USFK means placing greater reliance in the strength of the ROK army while U.S. ground forces are concentrated in the Middle East.
Bell has tried to portray the rearrangement of the relationship and roles of the ROK military and the USFK as mutually beneficial and supportive. In his official statement to Congress he wrote, “(t)his evolution provides a stronger and more complementary Alliance that is better organized to meet ROK securities needs and our mutual interests in the region” (Bell, ASC, 18). Despite such rhetoric, in question and answer sessions during congressional hearings he has repeatedly emphasized that he expects the ROK army to play the major part in defending the nation. He told Senate Armed Service Committee members:
It is now time for us (the U.S.) to turn over more and more of the security responsibility of the Republic of Korea to the Koreans… Part of that is an agreement that the two nations have made at the senior administration level to move our forces from north of Seoul and in Seoul to south of Seoul, thus ensuring that the South Koreans are responsible for dealing directly with the threat along the DMZ. And second, getting our forces literally out from under artillery range. And last, allowing us to consolidate at efficient hubs, instead of these often-times pathetic little enclaves where we are still living and working. (Senate Armed Services, 32)
At the same time as he continues to demand the ROK pay more and more money to keep the U.S. stationed in South Korea, Bell himself has admitted that rather than constructing a “strong and more complimentary Alliance,” the U.S. is moving its troops out of the way of the most significant threat in order to carry out its training. What is more, if the exercises conducted at U.S. bases in Korea over the last few years are any indicators, it is likely that the goal of training is not merely preparation for conflict with North Korea, but also for participation in the U.S. initiated wars in the Middle East. In 2004, the U.S. military publication, Stars and Stripes, reported the first example of the strategic flexibility of the USFK: the deployment of the Second Infantry Divisions’ 3,600-man Brigade Combat Team or “Strikeforce” to Iraq, and continued to follow their activity in the volatile city of Ramadi for the next year (Stars and Stripes, Pacific Edition, August 4 2004). Strikeforce moved to Fort Carson, Colorado upon completion of their one-year rotation, but it has since become clear that control of their brigade, rather than being relinquished to commanders in the Middle East, has always remained in the hands of the Second Infantry Division with the brigade eventually returning to Korea. More recently, Stars and Stripes has reported that Second Infantry Division battalions carried out ambush drills in February of 2006 at the Rodriquez Range in Northern Gyeonggi Province in preparation for participation in the Iraq war and the 52nd Medical Battalion trained for dispatch to Iraq and Afghanistan at Warrior Base, also in Northern Gyeonggi Province in March 2006 (Stars and Stripes Pacific Edition, February 22 and March 3, 2006). In March of this year the RSOI (Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration/Foal Eagle) exercises took place, bringing U.S. troops stationed in Hawaii and Okinawa to Korea to participate in the training (Stars and Stripes Pacific Edition, March 15 and 26, 2007). In addition, Stars and Stripes has reported that Patriot Missile units in Korea are currently involved in a new rotation system called Army Force Generation, which is aimed at getting troops ready for global deployment. Considering these instances, it is possible to predict that the new training facilities at Camp Humphrys will not only be used for improving readiness for the “defense of Korea,’ but also for the training of the USFK and even troops stationed elsewhere in the world before they are dispatched to take their place in the United States’ so-called “War on Terror.”
Bell has also spoken of North Korea several times as if it in fact poses no real threat at all. He told the House Armed Service Committee for instance: "(North Korea), at the end of the Cold War, lost their client states, Russia and China in terms of re-supplying large quantities of material and equipment. The exercise program they had in those days is no longer conducted. So North Korea is quite isolated with respect to their ability to generate combat power” (Bell, House AS, audio, 35min). General Fallon also made the statement that, “the threat of conflict in this region (East Asia) is low and continues to be that,” (audio, 10) and “I believe we have the capabilities today to over-match any threat today and for the foreseeable future” (audio, 1:08).
If such statements seem to entirely contradict the portrayal of North Korea in Bell’s official reports, this is because his objectives in the two cases are different: In the official documents Bell is relying on cold-war style vilification of North Korea to justify U.S. presence and military expansion in Korea; however, when in dialogue with Congress members he has sought to allay concerns that the war in the Middle East is compromising security in East Asia by minimizing the threat of a North Korean attack. In addition, Bell has another project in mind for which he must win congressional support: many of the new buildings planned for Camp Humphries are meant for the families of service members, whom Bell proposes to bring to Korea.
Planned Community for Soldiers’ Families
Currently, members of the U.S. Armed Forces serve a one-year term of duty when stationed in Korea. Most come without their families. This system of ‘unaccompanied one-year rotations’ is standard practice for the U.S. military in ‘combat’ situations. But, Bell has stated, the designation of ‘combat-mentality rotations’ no longer applies because Korea is no longer a ‘combat’ situation. Regardless of the way he has played up the North Korean threat at times, Bell’s plan to bring families to Korea reinforces the position he and Fallon have taken that the threat of conflict in the region is low. As such, he is preparing to submit a proposal to the Department of Defense calling for a change to ‘three-year accompanied terms’—meaning that many if not all married USKF servicemembers will bring their families to live with them in Korea in apartments built at Camp Humphrys. According to Bell, the new construction taking place in Pyongtaek will create “planned communities that… integrate work spaces/areas, barracks, dormitories, family housing, schools, day care centers, religious facilities, shopping areas, and MWR activities” (Bell, House Appropriations Committee Statement, 10). Camp Humphrys will also include a golf course, swimming pool and recreation facilities for servicemembers and their families. The South Korean government is providing the money to build some of these facilities through the Yongsan Base Relocation and Land Partnership Plans and through increased burden share funds gathered from Korean citizens’ taxes. It is also providing the land free of charge on which the U.S. can build, having forcibly evicted the residents from the Paengsung area. All of this despite the fact that, clearly, planned communities for family members of U.S. soldiers have very little to do with South Korea’s national defense.
Conclusion
Why is it that Bell’s assertions have been consistently so inconsistent with each other? It is because he has been engaged in several different conversations, motivated by different agendas, at the same time. The first – the official discourse of his written statements –rests on the premise of the U.S. as a protector of South Korea, an ideological relic of the Cold War which still serves to justify the U.S. military presence and modernization of the USFK. A second involves demonstrating to the United States Congress that the U.S. is putting its interest first and gaining a great deal from the base transfer and expansion, yet is made palatable through references to a more equal relationship between the ROK and the U.S., for which the ROK has asked. A third involves defending against accusations that the wars in the Middle East are too taxing. Finally, a fourth is an effort to justify his plans for 3-year accompanied service rotations for the USFK.
Throughout these conversations the changing characterization of North Korea – from impotent and backwards to menacing and maniacal – tells us very little about the real level of threat posed by North Korea and nothing at all about the regime as a political actor in East Asia. It does, however, demonstrate that in the U.S. military policy discourse, North Korea functions not as a real object of examination or a subject with which to be engaged, but rather as an ideological other that can take center stage when military build-up needs justification and then move to the back row when other matters of concern are under discussion.
In all his contradictory explanations Bell has never stated clearly the true purpose of the realignment of the U.S. troops and the base expansion at Pyeongtaek, but we can logically deduce from his statements and in the construction plans for Camp Humphrys: The goal is the creation of a flexible force capable of carrying out acts of aggression in East Asia and the Middle East and the construction of an outpost for their training, for the storage of advanced munitions, and for the collection and processing of intelligence. It will also be a protected zone of luxury for the families of U.S. servicemembers, while it anchors the U.S. hegemony in the region.
